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Abstract
We combine stylized facts from social network literature with findings
from the literature on the gender wage gap in a formal model. This
model is b a s e d   o n   e m p l o y e r s ’   u s e   o f   s o c i a l   n e t w o r k s   in the hiring
process in order to assess employee productivity. As a result, there is a
persistent gender wage gap, with women being underpaid relative to men
after controlling for productivity characteristics. Networks exhibit
inbreeding biases by productivity and by gender, which in combination
w i t h   w o m e n ’ s   l o w e r   n e t w o r k   d e n s i t y   c a u s e   w o m e n   t o be hired less often
through referral, as well as receive a lower average referral wage
premium. Finally, we use 2001-2006 UK Labour Force Survey data to
test the hypotheses implied by our model. We find that networks do
indeed account for a significant part of the gender wage gap for newly
hired workers.
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I. Introduction
The economic literature on the gender wage gap is extensive, yet a significant portion of
that gap remains unexplained (e.g. see Blau et al 2006). Several hypotheses have been put forward
for this unexplained gap, including preference-based discrimination and statistical discrimination
(for an overview, see Altonji and Blank 1999). The most novel approach to the gender wage gap,
pioneered by Montgomery (1991), is that of social networks.
Research findings from sociology and economics show that social networks play an
important role in labor markets.
3 Ioannides and Datcher-Loury (2004) and Calvó-Armengol and
Ioannides (2005) distinguish two mechanisms through which social networks influence the
functioning of labor markets. Firstly, from the employee perspective, social networks provide workers
looking for jobs with information about vacancies and job characteristics. Secondly, from the
employer perspective, networks provide firms looking for workers with information about applicant
ability through the job referral mechanism. Hires mediated through such referrals mitigate
employer uncertainty about applica n t s ’   productivity.
A number of recent papers have used the importance of social networks to model
persistent income inequalities among different groups in the labor market (Calvó-Armengol and
Jackson 2004; Buhai and van der Leij 2006; Ioannides and Soetevent 2006; Calvó-Armengol and
Jackson 2007). All these papers model the impact of networks on income inequalities through the
employee perspective. We contribute to this literature in two ways. Firstly, we use the employer
perspective to present a simple model with imperfect information that predicts a gender wage
gap in equilibrium. Social networks exhibit inbreeding biases by ability and by gender, and
w o m e n ’ s   n e t w o r k   d e n s i t y   i s   l o w e r   t h a n   m e n ’ s .
4 Workers hired through referral earn a higher wage
3 For an excellent overview, see Ioannides and Datcher-Loury (2004).
4 See Buhai and van der Leij (2006) for the most recent overview of empirical findings on social network
composition.- 2 -
because inbreeding bias by ability reduces the uncertainty about applicant productivity. The
gender wage gap arises because women are hired less often through referral, and because the
referral wage for women is lower than the referral wage for men. Secondly, we test to what extent
our model can account for the empirical gender wage gap. Using UK Labour Force Survey data
over 2001-2006, we compare the wages of male and female newly hired workers who have found
their job through referral by a friend already employed at the firm with those who have found
their job through an advertisement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the network
model for the gender wage gap: we describe the assumptions, derive the equilibrium, and discuss
the empirically testable implications of the model. In section III, the data is described. Section IV
performs the empirical tests by means of individual regression and Oaxaca decomposition.
Section V concludes.
II. A social network model for the gender wage gap
II.A Assumed network structure
Assume a continuum of firms employing one of four types of workers: (H,M), (H,F),
(L,M), (L,F) where H denotes high-ability, L low-ability, M male, and F female. Also assume only
the firm knows the type of its worker because worker ability has been revealed to her after an
initial period of employment. Each incumbent worker is associated with a total population of
potential hires that is normalized to unity and equally distributed over the four worker types.
However, not all workers in the total population of all potential hires are effectively part of the
i n c u m b e n t   w o r k e r ’ s   n e t w o r k .   As will become clear below, this assumption is made to allow
network structures to differ by gender and ability and to generate the selection of worker types
(not) hired through referral that is needed to explain the gender wage gap in equilibrium.- 3 -
To see this, consider the top and bottom panels of Figure 1, where the equally distanced
axes reflect the potential hires of each worker type. The top and bottom panels consider the cases
where the incumbent worker is male and female, respectively. The four points connected by
d o t t e d   l i n e s   t h e n   r e f l e c t   t h e   i n c u m b e n t   w o r k e r ’ s   n e t w o r k .   For example, the distance OA reflects
the fraction of   , i M -types in the total population of potential new hires in the network of an
  , i M -type incumbent worker. More generally, the top panel assumes there is inbreeding bias by
gender since men are more likely to know men given that
( )/( ) 1/2 OA OD OA OB OC OD      . Also, an incumbent male worker is more likely to
know workers of a similar ability type since ( )/( ) 1/2 OA OC OA OB OC OD      , capturing
inbreeding bias by ability. Similarly, the bottom panel of Figure 1 shows that there is inbreeding
bias by gender since ( ' ')/( ' ' ' ') 1/2 OB OC OA OB OC OD      and that there is inbreeding
bias by ability since ( ' ')/( ' ' ' ') 1/2 OA OC OA OB OC OD      . In addition to inbreeding
biases by gender and ability, Figure 1 also assumes that
( ) ( ' ' ' ') OA OB OC OD OA OB OC OD        , i.e. men have bigger social networks
compared to women. Finally, note that because the top and bottom panels of Figure 1 are
independent of ability type, it is assumed in this simple model that network density does not
differ by ability.
The remainder of Section II is organized as follows. Section II.B more formally introduces
the key parameters of the model: inbreeding bias by gender, inbreeding bias by ability and
network density. Section II.C then describes the equilibrium hiring strategy and Section II.D
derives the equilibrium gender wage gap. Finally, Section II.E derives an estimable expression for
the gender wage gap.
II.B Inbreeding biases and network densities- 4 -
Define the conditional probability      j i j i P , | , as the probability that a potential new
hire of ability i and gender j is connected to a given incumbent worker of type   j i, . Inbreeding
bias by gender,  , is then given by:
(1)          
                   
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j i j i P j i j i P j i j i P j i j i P
j i j i P j i j i P
 .
That is, is defined as the probability that a connected potential new hire is of the same gender
as the incumbent worker, relative to the probability that any given potential new hire is connected
to the incumbent worker. We assume that inbreeding bias by gender is independent of ability and
that the degree of gender inbreeding is the same for men and women. Also note that inbreeding
bias by gender is complete when equals 1 and that there is no inbreeding bias by gender if 
would equal 1/2.
Similarly, inbreeding bias by ability, , can be defined as:
(2)          
                   
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, | ~ , ~ , | , ~ , | ~ , , | ,







j i j i P j i j i P j i j i P j i j i P
j i j i P j i j i P
 .
That is, is defined as the probability that a connected potential new hire is of the same ability-
type as the incumbent worker. Again we assume that inbreeding bias by ability is independent of
gender and that the degree of ability inbreeding bias is the same for high and low ability workers.
Define the density of a network as:
(3)                         , 0 , | , , | , , | , , | , 1 i j P i j i j P i j i j P i j i j P i j i j           .
If men have larger networks, we must then have that , , i M i F    .
II.C The model
In attracting new workers, firms can hire either through the network of an incumbent
worker (the referral market) or through other means of job search (the outside market). It does- 5 -
so either by communicating a referral wage,
R
j w , to its incumbent worker who passes it on to her
network or by paying an outside market wage,
O w , through an impersonal channel. Each firm
can only offer a single referral or outside market wage that does not discriminate between newly
hired men and women but different firms with different ( , ) i j -types of incumbent workers could
offer different referral wages. Also assume the outside market wage which each firm takes as
given is unique and equal to the expected productivity of all workers not hired through referral.
Proposition 1: Given that it is optimal for an employer to hire through the network of its
incumbent worker, the referral wage will be such that max
O R R R




F w the referral wage offered to the network of an incumbent female
worker,
R
M w the referral wage offered to the network of an incumbent male worker, and
max
R w t h e   n e t w o r k ’ s   e x p e c t e d   p r o d u c t i v i t y .
In order for a firm to attract connected workers through its incumbent worker’ s   n e t w o r k ,
a wage above the market wage has to be offered. The lowest referral wage that the firm could
offer would therefore be
O w , where the firm extracts the entire surplus associated with the
existence of networks. The highest referral wage the firm could offer is max
R w , where the referred
workers extract the entire surplus associated with the existence of networks.
To determine the way the surplus generated by the existence of networks is shared
among firms and connected workers, and the effect on referral wages, we assume the following.
Each individual in a network has to incur a cost for being part of it. This cost is a monotonically
increasing function of network density, since in the network each individual has to maintain
contact with each other individual. The incumbent worker only agrees to relay a referral wage- 6 -
offer to her network ties if each of her ties is compensated for their cost of maintaining the
network. In order to remain in the network and generate future referral offers for herself through
her network ties, the incumbent worker has to relay a referral wage offer to her network that at
least compensates them for the cost incurred in maintaining the network. Therefore, male
incumbent workers demand a higher referral wage for their network ties than do female
incumbent workers because male incumbent workers have a higher network density. As a result,
it holds that
R R
M F w w  .
Proposition 2: It is an equilibrium that all firms employing   , H j -type incumbent
workers offer a referral wage
R
j w for , j M F  and such that
R R
M F w w  ; and all firms
employing   , L j -type incumbent workers for , j M F  hire workers on the outside
market at the outside market wage
O w . (Proof: see Appendix A)
To see that each firm employing an H-type incumbent worker has no incentive to deviate
from its equilibrium strategy, consider the following. Given that max
R R
j w w  and max
R w equals the
average productivity of an H-type network, firms employing an H-type incumbent worker make a
profit by hiring through referral.
5 In the outside market, on the other hand, the wage equals the
average outside market productivity and therefore profits are zero. This is why no single firm
employing an H-type incumbent worker has an incentive to deviate from the strategy of only
hiring through referral.
To see that each single firm employing an L-type incumbent worker has no incentive to
deviate from its equilibrium strategy, consider the following. Firms employing an L-type
5 Note that profit per worker is lower for firms employing a male high-ability incumbent worker than for firms
employing a female high-ability incumbent worker. On the other hand, the difference in total profit is not
determined a priori.- 7 -
incumbent worker have to offer
R O
j w w  in order to hire through referral. Therefore, for these
firms to break even or make a profit, the average productivity of the L-type network has to be
higher than the average productivity in the outside market. However, in Appendix A it is proven
that in the assumed separating equilibrium, the average productivity in the outside market
exceeds the average productivity in L-type networks.
That is, in this separating equilibrium the expected productivity from an H-type network
is higher and the expected productivity from an L-type network is lower compared to the outside
market which is what makes this equilibrium stable.
Proposition 3: The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is unique. (Proof: see
Appendix B)
Given the assumptions made, three other scenarios are possible, none of which can be an
equilibrium:
1. No networks are used. In this case each firm employing an H-type incumbent worker has an
incentive to deviate since this will increase profits given Proposition 1.
2. All networks are used. In this case each firm employing an L-type incumbent worker has an
incentive to deviate since the average ability in the market equals the population wide average,
whereas L-type networks exhibit inbreeding bias by ability. Given Proposition 1, a firm
employing an L-type incumbent worker makes losses by not deviating: hiring through the market
instead of through referral raises profits to zero.
3. Only L-type networks are used. In this case each firm has an incentive to deviate. Each firm
employing an H-type incumbent worker has an incentive to deviate since this will increase profits
given Proposition 1. Also, each firm employing an L-type incumbent worker makes losses by not
deviating: hiring through the market instead of through referral raises profits to zero.- 8 -
II.D Equilibrium gender wage gap for new hires
Proposition 4: In the unique equilibrium, the mean wage of male hires exceeds the mean
wage of female hires.
Proof:
The mean male wage for new hires, M w , can be written as:





M H M M H F F H M H F w w w w                 
Note that the number of male workers hired through referral is given by   , , 1 H M H F      ,
where the first term is male workers referred by a male incumbent worker (receiving
R
M w ), and
the second term those referred by a female incumbent worker (receiving
R
F w ). Also, since the
male population of new hires has been normalized to 2, the term   , , 2 1 H M H F       gives
the number of male workers not hired through referral (receiving
O w ). Equation (4) therefore
shows that the mean male wage is given by the weighted average of the two referral wages and
the market wage, where the weights are the proportion of the male population that receives each
of the three wages earned in the economy.
The mean female wage can be derived analogously





F H M M H F F H M H F w w w w                 
Taking the difference between (5) and (4) gives the expression for the gender wage gap:
(6)           , , , ,
1 1 2 2 1
2
R R O
F M H M M H F F H M H F w w w w w             
Denoting
R R
F M w w    , where  captures the gender difference in referral wages offered
through male and female incumbent workers, equation (6) can be rewritten as- 9 -
(7)     , , ,
1 1
1 2 ( ) 1 2
2 2
R O
F M H M H F M H F w w w w      
                            
      , , , , , ,
1 1
1 1 1 0
2 2
R O
H F H F H M H F M H F H F w w                                             
It follows from (7) that there is a gender wage gap for new hires in equilibrium, since 1 2 1    ,
, , H M H F    and
R R O
M F w w w   . The first expression in square brackets multiplied by 1 2 is
the difference between the fraction of female hired through referral   , , 1 2 1 H F H F         
and male workers hired through referral   , , 1 2 1 H M H F          . The second expression in
square brackets is the referral wage premium earned by the workers in the network of an
incumbent   , H M -type worker. Finally, the last expression in curly brackets is the fraction of
female workers hired through referral by an incumbent   F H, -type worker, , 1 2 H F   , minus the
fraction of male workers hired through referral by an incumbent   F H, -type worker,
  , 1 2 1 H F   , pre-multiplied by .
Note that the equilibrium gender wage gap is driven by the two terms in curly brackets.
Firstly, a smaller fraction of female than of male hires receives a referral wage offer, despite there
being no gender differences in the productivity distribution. In other words, women are
underrepresented in the referral market, where wages are higher; and overrepresented in the
outside market, where wages are lower. Secondly, a larger fraction of the women that are hired
through referral receives the lower referral wage
R
F w , in comparison to men hired through
referral. The lower referral wage for workers in the network of an incumbent   F H, -type worker
i s   c a u s e d   b y   i n c u m b e n t   w o m e n ’ s   l o w e r   n e t w o r k   d e n s i t y . More female than male new hires
receive this lower referral wage, due to inbreeding bias by gender. This implies that the second
term increases the absolute value of the gender wage gap.- 10 -
II.E Empirical implications of the model
Consider a sample of newly hired individuals such that:
(8)             X referral sex referral sex w ' ) * ( 4 3 2 1 0
where w reflects log hourly wages, sex is a gender dummy equal to 1 if a person is female, referral is
a dummy equal to 1 if a person has been hired through referral, and X is a vector of person-
specific and job related controls. The final term reflects sampling error assumed to be
independently and identically distributed with mean zero.
The overall mean male and female wages of newly hired individuals are then given by:
(9)       0 1 2 3 4 | 1 ( ) | 1 ' | 1 E wsex E referral sex E X sex             
(10)       0 2 4 | 0 | 0 ' | 0 E wsex E referral sex E X sex         
such that the overall gender wage gap for new hires can be written as:
(11)     1 2 3 4 [ | 1] [ | 0] ' F M F M F E w sex E w sex ref ref ref X X             
In equation (11), F ref is defined as the fraction of all newly hired women that are hired through
referral and M ref is the fraction of all newly hired men that are hired through referral.
Note that equation (7) showed that the gender wage gap among new hires with identical
person-specific and job related characteristics was defined as:
(12)     ( )
HF HF R O
F M M F M F M w w w w ref ref ref ref       
    ( )
HM HF R O
M F M F F M w w ref ref ref ref ref        
where the last equation can be deduced using that
HF HF
F F M ref ref ref   , with
HM
F ref the
fraction of female workers hired through an   , H M -type incumbent worker, and
HF
M ref the
fraction of male workers hired through an   , H F -type incumbent worker.- 11 -




M ref are equal to zero, since
there would be no women (men) in the network of an   , H M -type (  , H F -type) incumbent
worker. In that case, 2 and 3  from equation (8) are equal to  
R O
M w w  and   , respectively.
However, if there is incomplete inbreeding bias by gender, there is no longer a one-to-one
correspondence between 2 and 3  and the parameters of equation (12). In this case, 2  is
interpreted as the wage premium for the average referred male hire, and 2 3    as the wage
premium for the average referred female hire.
In our model, male workers hired through referral earn a premium, which implies 2  has
a positive sign. In addition, 3  has a negative sign, but such that 2 3 0     since the average
female worker hired through referral still earns a premium, albeit lower than the average male
worker. This lower premium is due to women being overrepresented in   , H F -type incumbent
w o r k e r s ’   n e t w o r k s ,   w h e r e   t h e   r e f e r r a l   w a g e   i s   l o w e r .   Equation (11) furthermore shows that the
overall gender wage gap can be decomposed into an unexplained part 1 ; the importance of
networks   2 3 F M F ref ref ref     ; and differences in person-specific and job related
characteristics,   4 ' F M X X   .
III. Data
We use quarterly UK Labour Force Survey (LFS) data from 2001 to 2006. Our data set
contains newly hired individuals, defined as those workers (excluding the self-employed) who
have been employed with their current employer for three months or less. The LFS has a
question called Howget, which asks respondents how they obtained their current job, conditional
on them having found a new job in the past 3 months. Respondents can select one of the- 12 -
following eight channels: reply to a job advertisement; job centre, jobmarket or training and
employment agency office; careers office; jobclub; private employment agency or business;
hearing from someone who worked there; direct application; or some other way. Of these
channels, “ hearing from someone who worked there” is exactly the referral mechanism that we
analyze in our model. On the other hand, “ reply to a job advertisement” is most similar to firms
hiring on an impersonal outside market. Table 1A displays the percentages of the use of these
various channels for newly hired men and women between 2001 and 2006. Referral and
advertisement are the two most important hiring channels, both for men and women. We only
retain these two channels because they provide the most direct test of our model.
6 Restricting our
attention to these two channels leaves 10,174 observations. Table 1B shows that 40.9 percent of
the women in our sample found their current job through a referral, against 51.1 percent of men.
Our dependent variable is the log hourly wage, calculated as the log of the gross weekly
salary over total usual weekly hours. We also use a number of person-specific and job related
variables available in the LFS. Firstly, we generate  a   s c a l e   f o r   i n d i v i d u a l s ’   e d u c a t i o n   b y   assigning
the LFS educational qualifications into three categories: below A-level qualifications; above A-
level, but below college degree qualifications; and college degree or higher qualifications.
7
Establishment size is coded from 1 (establishments under 25 workers) to 3 (establishments over
500 workers). The dummy for part-time work is equal to one when the respondent reports
working part-time.
8 The occupational classification used is the 2000 Standard Occupational
Classification; the industry classification is the 1992 Standard Industry Classification.
Table 2 presents the mean values of the person-specific and job related characteristics by
gender. It can be seen that the female new hires in our sample are on average slightly younger,
6 Including the other channels through which jobs are found into the analysis does not qualitatively change results.
7 We have also calculated years of education using age and the year at which continuous full-time education was
completed. Substituting years of education for the three-category educational variable in the regressions does not
qualitatively change our results.
8 In our sample, the average usual weekly hours worked by individuals reporting to work part-time is 16.9 hours; for
individuals reporting to work full-time, it is 41.3 hours.- 13 -
less educated, more likely to work part-time, and more likely to work in a smaller establishment
than the male new hires.
IV. Empirical analysis
Table 3 presents regression results of equation (8). The first column gives the raw gender
wage gap for newly hired workers, which is 11.7 percent.
9 The second column controls for a
number of person-specific and job related characteristics: education, age, age squared,
establishment size, a dummy for part-time work, and one-digit occupation and industry codes.
These controls reduce the gender wage gap to 7.6 percent. Column 3 includes the referral
dummy, and the referral dummy interacted with sex. It can be seen that both have the expected
sign, such that a male worker hired through referral on average earns 5.3 percent more than a
worker hired through an ad, and a female worker hired through referral on average earns 1.5
(=5.3-3.8) percent more than a worker hired through an ad. More importantly, column 3 shows
that the inclusion of the referral terms reduces the unexplained gender wage gap by 1.9
percentage points, or 25 percent (=[0.076-0.057]/0.076*100) of its total size.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 repeat the procedure of the previous two columns, but
looking at the unexplained gender wage gap within the most disaggregated occupation and
industry categories that are available in the LFS. These regression results show that the signs on
referral and referral interacted with sex do not change, and neither does the effect on the
unexplained gender wage gap. A male worker hired through referral on average earns 3.6 percent
more than a worker hired through an ad, and a female worker hired through referral on average
earns 1.9 percent more than a worker hired through an ad. The referral terms reduce the
9 For the entire sample of workers in the LFS between 2001and 2006, the raw gender wage gap is 23.0 percent. After
controlling for person-specific and job related characteristics, the remaining gender wage equals 12.4 percent.- 14 -
unexplained gender wage gap by 14 percent (=[0.063-0.054]/0.063*100). In sum, Table 3 shows
that networks do indeed explain a significant portion of the unexplained gender wage gap.
Table 4 further investigates the explanatory power of the referral terms by showing the
results of an Oaxaca decomposition. Column 1 decomposes the gender wage gap into a part
attributable to gender differences in person-specific and job related characteristics and a part
attributable to differences in returns to those characteristics. In column 2, the referral terms,
differences in referral opportunity and differences in returns to referral, are included in the
decomposition.   C o l u m n   2   s h o w s   t h a t   w o m e n ’ s   l o w e r   r e f e r r a l   o p p o r t u n i t y   contributes 0.5
percentage points to the gender wage gap,   w h e r e a s   w o m e n ’ s   l o w e r   r e f e r r a l   w a g e   p r e m i u m  
contributes 2.7 percentage points to the gender wage gap. Also, it is clear that referral explains
part of the gender difference in returns to person-specific and job related characteristics. In total,
the referral terms constitute 27 percent (=0.032/0.117*100) of the predicted gender wage gap.
In Table 5, we provide information on another implication of our network model, namely
that the effect of referral on wages depends on the importance of unobserved ability. After all,
networks are the channel through which employers can more accurately estimate worker
productivity on the job. For some jobs, the ability of workers required to perform the job is more
difficult to observe at the time of hiring than for other jobs. This implies that the referral wage
premium should be larger in those jobs where output is more dependent on the ability to
perform the job.
10 We expect that to be the case for jobs that have high education requirements:
if ability, observed and unobserved, is important for worker productivity, the firm will employ
more highly educated workers and will be more willing to pay for hiring through networks.
10 In our model, we have assumed high-ability and low-ability workers to have productivities of 1 and 0, respectively.
Making these values more similar makes output less ability-dependent, thereby decreasing the value of the
information transmitted by referral and thus the referral wage premium. Since the referral wage must lie somewhere
in between the cost of maintaining the network to the worker and the expected productivity of the network to the
employer, a higher expected network productivity (as is the case in ability-sensitive jobs) leads to a higher referral
wage.- 15 -
Therefore, from our model we would expect the referral wage premium to increase with
education.
Table 5 therefore repeats the analyses of Table 3 but includes the interaction of referral
with years of education. It can be deduced from column 3 that there is a positive average referral
premium for men and for women. Since the average number of years of education is around 12
for both men and women, the average male hired through referral receives a wage premium of
4.8 percent ([0.014*12]– 0.12), and the average female one of 1.6 percent ([0.014*12]– 0.12– 0.032).
Moreover, the referral premium for both men and women increases with 1.4 percent for each
additional year of education. Therefore, in line with the predictions of our model, the referral
premium for both men and women increases with education.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we have drawn from the emerging social network literature to account for
the part of the gender wage gap that remains unexplained after controlling for person-specific
and job related characteristics.
We have presented a simple network model for the gender wage gap of newly hired
w o r k e r s   w h e r e   i n b r e e d i n g   b i a s e s   a n d   w o m e n ’ s   s m a l l e r   n e t w o r k   d e n s i t y   c o m b i n e   t o   a n  
equilibrium gender wage gap. In specific, two factors cause the gender wage gap: women have
fewer opportunities to be hired through referral and women receive a lower referral wage
premium than men on average.
We test our theoretical model using 2001-2006 UK Labour Force Survey data and find
that networks contribute between 14 to 25 percent to the unexplained gender wage gap. Of the
two contributing factors, men receiving a higher average referral wage premium is more
important than men being hired more often through referral. In line with predictions from our- 16 -
model, we also find that the referral wage premium for both men and women increases with
years of education.- 17 -
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D   , i F - 19 -
Reply to advertisement 25.0 33.7
Job centre 8.16 6.90
Careers office 0.68 0.45
Jobclub 0.07 0.11
Private employment agency 11.46 8.70
Hearing from someone who worked there 26.2 23.3
Direct application 16.2 16.9
Some other way 12.1 9.88
Observations 8787 9941
Table 1A: Summary Statistics - Hiring Channels for Men and
Women, %
Male Female
UK Labour Force Survey 2001-2006. Newly hired workers with tenure
of 3 months or less. Total percentages may not add to 100 because of
rounding errors.
Reply to advertisement 48.9 59.1
Hearing from someone who worked there 51.1 40.9
Observations 4502 5672
Table 1B: Summary Statistics - Howget for Men and Women, %
Male Female
UK Labour Force Survey 2001-2006. Newly hired workers with tenure
of 3 months or less.
Mean age 31.7 31.4
Mean education 2.91 2.84
Mean value of ftpt dummy 1.22 1.51
Mean establishment size 1.71 1.66
Observations 4502 5672
Table 2: Summary Statistics - Mean Person Specific
and Job Related Characteristics by Gender
UK Labour Force Survey 2001-2006. Newly hired workers
with tenure of 3 months or less.
Male Female- 20 -
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female -0.117 -0.076 -0.057 -0.063 -0.054
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011)
Referral - - 0.053 - 0.036
(0.011) (0.011)
- - -0.038 - -0.017
(0.015) (0.015)
Education - 0.089 0.091 0.071 0.072
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Age - 0.041 0.042 0.040 0.040
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Age2 - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Adjusted R
2 0.012 0.437 0.438 0.496 0.497
Table 3: Networks and the Gender Wage Gap












UK Labour Force Survey 2001-2006. Newly hired workers with
tenure of 3 months or less. The number of observations for each
column is 10174. Columns (2) to (5) also control for establishment
size and a dummy for part-time work.- 21 -
no referral referral
(1) (2)
Predicted gender wage gap 0.117 0.117
Characteristics 0.026 0.027
Fraction referred - 0.005
Returns to characteristics 0.090 0.056
Difference in referral premium - 0.027
Table 4: Oaxaca Decompositions of the Gender Wage Gap
Predicted difference due to
differences in :
UK Labour Force Survey 2001-2006. Newly hired workers with
tenure of 3 months or less. The decompositions use male returns to
premultiply gender differences in person-specific and job related
characteristics. Using female returns does not change results. The
decomposition of predicted differences may not exactly sum up to the
total predicted gender wage gap due to rounding errors.
(1) (2) (3)
Female -0.132 -0.086 -0.071
(0.009) (0.008) (0.010)







2 0.017 0.430 0.432
Observations 10833
Yrs educ x referral
UK Labour Force Survey 2001-2006. Newly hired workers
with tenure of 3 months or less. The controls in columns
(2) and (3) are are 1-digit occupation and industry codes,
establishment size and a dummy for part-time work.
Table 5: Networks and the Gender Wage Gap by Years
of Education
Dependent Variable: ln(hourly wage)
Female x referral
Controls +
Referral Controls Raw- 22 -
Appendix A
Proposition 2: It is an equilibrium that all firms employing   , H j -type incumbent
workers offer a referral wage
R
j w for , j M F  and such that
R R
M F w w  ; and all firms
employing   , L j -type incumbent workers for , j M F  hire workers on the outside
market at the outside market wage
O w . (Proof: see Appendix A)
Proof:
No single firm has an incentive to deviate from its hiring strategy: we consider firms by
incumbent worker ability-type.
No single firm employing an   , H j -type worker has an incentive to deviate by hiring
through the market. For a firm employing an   , H j -type worker, profits in the equilibrium are
positive (see Proposition 1) and when deviating by hiring through the market profits are lowered
to zero since average labor market productivity in the outside market equals the market wage.
No single firm employing an   , L j -type worker has an incentive to deviate. For a firm
employing an   , L j -type worker, profits in the equilibrium are zero, but will be negative when
deviating by hiring through referral. In order to prove that profits of hiring through referral are
negative, we need to show that the average productivity in the   , L j -type networks is lower than
the average productivity in the market.
To show this we use that the average productivity in the outside market is a
monotonically increasing function of the fraction of H-type workers in the outside market. The
number of H-type workers in the outside market (
O H ) is:- 23 -
  , , 2
O
H M H F H     
In the equilibrium, the number of L-type workers in the outside market (
O L ) equals:
    , , 2 1
O
H M H F L       
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The fraction of H-type workers in   , L j -type networks equals 1   .








H M H F







In sum, the average ability in the outside market is higher than in   , L j -networks, and no single
firm employing an   , L j -type worker will want to deviate by hiring through referral, given
Proposition 1.- 24 -
Appendix B
Proposition 3: The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 is unique.
Proof:
In order to prove Proposition 3, we need to examine the other possible equilibria and
show that firms have incentives to deviate. We discuss each of the three alternative equilibrium
scenarios in turn.
1. No networks are used.
All workers offer their labor in the outside market. As a result, the mean ability in the market
equals the population-wide mean ability. In this case each firm employing an   , H j -type worker
has an incentive to deviate since this will increase profits given Proposition 1.
2. All networks are used.
For a firm employing an   , L j -type worker, profits are negative, but will be zero when deviating
by hiring through the outside market. In order to prove that profits of hiring through referral are
negative, we need to show that the average productivity in the L-type networks is lower than the
average productivity in the market, given Proposition 1.
The average ability in the outside market is a monotonically increasing function of the fraction of
H-type workers. The number of H-type workers in the outside market is given by
      , , , , 2 1
O
H M H F L M L F H           
The number of L-type workers the outside market is given by
      , , , , 2 1
O
H M H F L M L F L           
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 , since , , H M L M    and , , H F L F   
Hence, the average ability in the outside market equals the population wide average ability.
The fraction of H-type workers in L-type networks equals 1   . Since1 2 1    , the average
ability in L-type networks is lower than the average ability in the outside market. Given this, each
firm employing an L-type worker has an incentive to deviate.
3. Only L-type networks are used.
In this case each single firm has an incentive to deviate. The average ability in the outside market
is a monotonically increasing function of the fraction of H-type workers. The number of H-type
workers in the outside market is given by
    , , 2 1 1
O
L M L F H       
The number of L-type workers in the outside market is given by
, , 2
O
L M L F L       
Calculating the fraction:
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since 1 2 1    and , 0 L j   .
Thus it has been shown that the average productivity in the outside market is higher than the
population wide productivity.
This gives each single firm employing an H-type worker an incentive to deviate given
Proposition 1. They break even in the outside market, whereas they would make a profit by
deviating and hiring through referral because the average ability the deviating firm can obtain is
higher than the average ability in the outside market. This is true since 1 2 1    such that
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Also, any single firm employing an L-type worker has an incentive to deviate, because
each firm employing an L-type worker makes a loss, given Proposition 1. The reason for this is
that the firms have to offer a referral wage above the market wage, but the fraction of H-type
workers is lower in the L-type network than in the outside market. Given that 1 2 1    it
holds that
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